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Readers of this journal will not be surprised to/learn that there is
some unhappiness and confusion in the house of social psychology, for
there have in recent years been numerous critiques of the field. Some
have been disappointed by a recognition that despite the hard work of the
past decades, we have not produced much in the way of practical knowledge
to help in the solution of pressing social problems. Other critics have
been concerned that our field may indeed have practical implications, but
that they are most likely to be realized by people in positions of power,
who may use our research (&dquo;pure&dquo; or otherwise) to stabilize and enhance
their personal well-being at the expense of the less powerful.
In a more parochial vein, apart from the matter of applicability, some
writers have focused on the dominant research trends of the times. Thus,
the ethics and intellectual content of the &dquo;fun-and’games&dquo; approach to
research, in which elaborate deceptions may be mounted in the interest of
&dquo;scientific progress,&dquo; have been widely criticized. (Can a serious in-
tellectual enterprise be securely anchored in a methodology that leans
so heavily on dramatic lies, told to college sophomores?) Other critics
have worried about the disparagement of theory, the notion that &dquo;ideas
are cheap,&dquo; and the continued dominance of laboratory experimentation.
The enlightened reader can add his or her own favorites to this litany of
criticism.
Despite these and other criticisms, however, most critics have shared
the researcher’s vision that social interaction is patterned--the idea
that through inspiration, hard work, and continued financial support, we
may discern some relatively stable regularities that appear and reappear,
as we study social interactions in a variety of times, places, and con-
texts. Professor Gergen is something of a maverick, however, for in his
essay (1973) on &dquo;Social Psychology as History,&dquo; he eschewed this hallowed
goal, arguing instead that because of its unique subject matter, social
psychology could not reasonably aspire to the stable generalizations that
have traditionally served as an incentive for investigators in the &dquo;hard&dquo;
sciences. Let us change our scientific goals, he urged, recognizing that
our subject matter is different. According to this view, social psychol-
ogy is inherently ephemeral, for the regularities that we observe here
and now are likely to change in a reasonable short time; and this will
always be true, since our behavior patterns may be importantly influenced
(changed) by changing social conditions, and by the feedback that social
scientists produce as they study our past and present behavior.
Gergen’s essay, with its unmistakable challenge to the orthodox goals
of social science, led to a number of reactions. Schlenker (1974) argued
that the difficulties we have encountered are not, in fact, inherently
different from those encountered in other fields, and might be placed in-
proper perspective, were we more sophisticated in matters pertaining to
the philosophy of science. Manis (1975) agreed that social behavior
often appears to be quite changeable. Nonetheless, he suggested the
possibility that &dquo;the processes underlying social behavior may be rela-
tively stable, although they may operate on an endless variety of social
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contents as we vary the time and place of our investigatons.&dquo; Thorn-
gate (1975) subsequently came to Gergen’s defense, and others expressed
an interest in joining the parade. Recognizing the potential usefulness
of this debate, Clyde Hendrick was kind enough to reserve space in PSPB,
and to invite several interested people to organize their views on the
matter. As an eager participant himself, he invited me to serve as a
guest editor (umpire) for this set of papers-, and I have found it an in-
teresting assignment; indeed, I was ultimately moved to join the band of
contributors. Hopefully, our collective efforts will help us to clarify
what it is that social psychology can reasonably aspire to accomplish.
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